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 Resource Conservation Vs. Food Aid Targeting in Tigray, Ethiopia
Food-for-work (FFW) projects face the challenge of addressing three kinds of objectives:
to feed hungry people, to build public works where needed, and to be feasible for prompt project
implementation.  In the debate over how to target FFW to the poorest of the poor, the last two
program objectives are often overlooked.  This research examines FFW afforestation and
erosion-control programs in central Tigray, Ethiopia, during 1992-95 in order to examine how
these sometimes conflicting objectives were reconciled.
The study decomposes the factors determining a household’s FFW participation into
three decision stages.  First, at the regional level, project planners choose where to locate a FFW
resource conservation project.  Second, at the village level, a committee decides which villagers
will be eligible to participate.  Finally, the eligibile households may decide whether and how
much to participate.
Using probit and truncated regression methods, the study finds that project
implementation feasibility most influenced the probability that FFW projects would be available
in the 25 villages surveyed.  Among the 129 households in villages with FFW available, FFW
eligibility was inversely related to household land area per capita and household size, results
which are consistent with anti-poverty targeting.  However, the model performed poorly at
predicting non-eligibility for FFW, which suggests that anti-poverty targeting was not efficient. 
Among households eligible for FFW, those with greater resources (larger families that did not
lease out land) tended to participate and supply more days of FFW labor than poorer households.
The only households eligible for FFW which did not participate were unable (rather than
unwilling) to do so, being comprised mostly of elderly women.  Overall, anti-poverty targeting
was sub-optimal but reasonable, given the feasibility constraint that these resource conservation
projects to be sited in where labor and materials could be made available.Reconciling Food-For-Work Objectives:
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ABSTRACT:
Reconciling Food-For-Work Objectives:
 Resource Conservation Vs. Food Aid Targeting in Tigray, Ethiopia
Food-for-work (FFW) projects face the challenge of addressing three kinds of objectives:
to feed hungry people, to build public works where needed, and to be feasible for prompt project
implementation.  In the debate over how to target FFW to the poorest of the poor, the last two
program objectives are often overlooked.  This research examines FFW afforestation and erosion-
control programs in central Tigray, Ethiopia, during 1992-95 in order to examine how these
sometimes conflicting objectives were reconciled.
The study decomposes the factors determining a household’s FFW participation into three
decision stages.  First, at the regional level, project planners choose where to locate a FFW
resource conservation project.  Second, at the village level, a committee decides which villagers
will be eligible to participate.  Finally, the eligibile households may decide whether and how much
to participate.
Using probit and truncated regression methods, the study finds that project
implementation feasibility most influenced the probability that FFW projects would be available in
the 25 villages surveyed.  Among the 129 households in villages with FFW available, FFW
eligibility was inversely related to household land area per capita and household size, results
which are consistent with anti-poverty targeting.  However, the model performed poorly at
predicting non-eligibility for FFW, which suggests that anti-poverty targeting was not efficient. 3
Among households eligible for FFW, those with greater resources (larger families that did not
lease out land) tended to participate and supply more days of FFW labor than poorer households.
The only households eligible for FFW which did not participate were unable (rather than
unwilling) to do so, being comprised mostly of elderly women.  Overall, anti-poverty targeting
was sub-optimal but reasonable, given the feasibility constraint that these resource conservation
projects to be sited in where labor and materials could be made available.
JEL Classification codes:  Q18, O13.
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Reconciling Food-For-Work Objectives:
Resource Conservation Vs. Food Aid Targeting in Tigray, Ethiopia
Governments throughout the world have been confronted with the challenge of ensuring
adequate food to low-income consumers. Food assistance programs have been important in
alleviating short-term food security problems of subsistence farmers in developing countries.
However concerns have arisen regarding the degree to which such programs are targeted
selectively to the poor, and the potential disincentive effects on food production incentives
(Singer, 1989; Fitzpatrick and Storey, 1989; Lavy 1992; Webb, von Braun and Yisehac, 1992).
In response to these concerns, some governments have placed increased emphasis on
alternative food transfer programs. Food-for-work (FFW) programs, which combine the two
distinct goals of distributing food to the needy and constructing public works, have been the most
common alternative food transfer mechanism. Although FFW programs are conceived under the
assumption that the two goals can be compatible, there is no reason a priori that they must be.
Food aid programs seek to target the needy; public works programs target able bodied workers in
locations where public works are needed and feasible to construct. Hence there are both a
logistical constraint and a design objective determining how well FFW can achieve the two sets of
goals.
This paper analyzes the relationship between participation in FFW programs and indicators
of poverty at the household level in Ethiopia. The results shed light on the extent to which FFW
programs can effectively isolate food transfer benefits to the poor and exclude the non-needy,5
thereby reducing the potential disincentive effects on domestic production.  The paper examines
the determinants of (1) location of FFW projects, (2) the selection of households eligible to
participate in FFW programs, and (3) the factors that influence whether the household chooses to
participate and how much effort it elects to contribute to FFW.  Results for FFW participation
during 1992-95 are based on a survey of 247 rural households from 30 villages in the Tigray
region of Ethiopia. Purposive selection of villages followed by random selection of households
ensured representation of the different agro-ecological zones.
Self-targeting food aid
Labor-intensive public works, if properly implemented, can effectively combine the
objectives of employment generation for the needy and capital asset formation. Although
programs differ in their emphasis on poverty alleviation, food security, and asset creation, the
underlying goal of public works programs has been conceived in terms of simultaneously
addressing these objectives (von Braun et al. 1991; Subbarao 1997).  The challenge is to
accomplish these objectives efficiently, in the sense of targeting project funds where they will
accomplish the most.  The rationale for targeting food aid is that if less needy households can be
excluded, more food remains available for those who need it most.
Food assistance programs that “self-target” are desirable because they avoid the high costs
of administering programs that seek to identify the poor and restrict benefits to them.  “Self-
targeting” projects are ones in which the poor choose to participate and the less poor choose not
to do so.  A commonly-used self-selection mechanism to increase the targeting efficiency of public6
works has been to set a wage (cash or in-kind) that is low enough to make participation
unattractive to any but the poorest (Ravallion and Datt, 1992).  However, low wages can fail to
target effectively for at least two reasons.  First, even relatively wealthier households often include
family members who are willing to work for low wages (Kebede et al. 1996).   Second, since rural
wage rates fluctuate seasonally, it may be difficult to establish a single wage that targets the poor
effectively throughout the year.  Basu (1982) has shown that if program wages exceed market
wage rates for unskilled labor, then the ability to exclude non-needy households is compromised
and job rationing is a likely outcome.
Design restrictions for resource conservation projects
Where FFW is directed toward resource conservation projects, two further design
restrictions may complicate efficient food aid targeting.  Common activities of resource
conservation projects include afforestation, erosion control, and dam construction.  Such projects
impose biophysical and/or topographical conditions that may not coincide with the poverty
objective of aid targeting.  For example, dams must be built in valleys, yet valley floors often offer
well-watered alluvial soils that may make for more prosperous farming communities.  Likewise,
terraces and bunds must be constructed on hill slopes, and trees must be planted where suitable
land is available.
Apart from geophysical suitability, the location of resource conservation projects must
also be logistically feasible.  Many such projects call for heavy inputs such as rocks or tree
seedlings rooted in soil.  If large trucks or barges are needed to transport heavy inputs, the project7
site must be accessible by road or waterway.  But communities near transport routes are often
more prosperous than isolated communities, so another potential conflict with anti-poverty
targeting rears its head.
Food-for-work in Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, FFW was first used in public works programs in the early 1960's.  By 1989,
FFW projects had proliferated to the point where 75 small-scale projects were being operated by
non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) (von Braun et al., 1991).   With the expansion of FFW,
the Ethiopian government and foreign donors grew increasingly concerned about the country’s
growing dependence on food aid and accountability for its use (Sharp, 1997).  A related concern
was that large quantities of food aid, if poorly targeted, may depress market prices for food,
discouraging domestic producers and undermining long-term food security (Maxwell et al., 1994).
The selection of FFW participants in Ethiopia has followed sharply different approaches.
In the southern part of the former Shoa region, four NGO’s used selection criteria that ranged
from relatively objective measures such as poverty level and physical fitness, to selection by
peasant associations, to a simple first-come-first-served basis (Kumar et al., 1993). 
In the Tigray region, FFW programs during the 1990's have largely focused on natural
resource rehabilitation.  Extensive soil erosion over decades (Wood, 1989; Stahl, 1990) and
extreme deforestation made hillside terraces and afforestation top priority activities in Tigray
following the downfall of Ethiopia’s military government in 1991.  Natural resource conservation
became the object of both organized community labor brigades as well as FFW projects.  In8
project villages, local committees decided which residents would be eligible to participate.  
Eligible households could then decide for themselves whether the daily food ration of 3 kilograms
of wheat and 12 grams of vegetable oil per person-day was worth the effort.
This setting provides an opportunity to examine our key research question regarding
“How compatible are the multiple objectives inherent in food aid targeting via resource
conservation projects?”   It seems plausible that the answer may vary along the chain of decisions
which are taken before any household member lifts a shovel on an FFW public works project. 
Using household survey data from central Tigray in 1992-95, we examine 1) which factors
determined the villages where FFW projects were located, 2) whether village committees
effectively targeted the poor as eligible for FFW, and 3) which factors most affected whether and
how much households chose to participate in FFW projects.
Conceptual model
The effectiveness of FFW targeting and the factors that affect level of participation are our
primary areas of interest.  Targeting effectiveness can be examined by evaluating the explanatory
variables that appear to predict who participated.  However, participation is determined at three
distinct decision levels, as illustrated in Figure 1.  First, regional governments and/or NGO’s
decide where FFW projects will be located.  This decision is based on the multiple objectives of
alleviating poverty and building such needed capital assets as stone terraces to reduce soil erosion
or new forests to provide fuel supplies.  The FFW project location decision is constrained by the
imperative to find sites where necessary inputs and equipment can be delivered.  Especially when9
FFW projects are designed to respond to short-term food shortages, the logistical feasibility
constraint can rule out locations that would require new roads in order to become accessible.
The second level decision in the Tigray context is taken by special committees in villages
where FFW projects have been located.  These village committees determine whether a household
is eligible to participate in the project.  The official objective is to limit eligibility to impoverished
households.  Because poverty was pervasive in Tigray during 1992-95, of interest is whether
those relatively poorer households were more likely to be found eligible.  Both the project
location decision and the eligibility decision are exogenous to the household.  However, if random
disturbances are distributed normally, both decisions can be modeled as probit regressions.  In
particular, probit regression can address the question of which factors most affect the likelihood
that a village is chosen for a FFW project – level of poverty, suitability for conservation
investments, or logistical feasibility for project implementation.  Likewise, probit can test the
success of village committees at targeting FFW eligibility to the neediest households, by
investigating whether household wealth or income per capita variables to predict eligibility (via an
inverse relationship).
Only at the third level of FFW decision does the rural household get to make choices. 
These are the linked decisions over whether to participate and how much effort to contribute to a
FFW resource conservation project.  The participation decision can be modeled as an endogenous
choice of household labor allocation. Focusing on the short-term decision about dry-season labor
allocation to FFW, consider a farm household whose concave utility function (U(z, l
e)) is defined
over consumption goods (z) and leisure (l
e).  We assume that the household seeks to maximize10
utility subject to the constraints that 1) the household budget is adequate, 2) its food needs (F) are
met from food sources, including household stocks  (f 
0), FFW food (f
f) or purchased food (f
p), 3)
the household labor supply equals the sum of wage labor (l
w), FFW labor (l
f), and leisure (l
e), and
4) the only available source of cash income (Y) is wage labor.  (After the rainy season is over,
agricultural work opportunities are assumed to be nil.)  The household’s constrained utility
maximization problem is thus,
If households qualifying for FFW eligibility lack excess food, then we can assume that the food
balance constraint is binding.  With this proviso, the following Lagrangean function can be
derived by substituting the food balance, labor supply and income identities into the constrained
optimization equation, as follows:
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which states that the wage rate (w, the marginal value of wage labor) should equal the marginal
value of food earnings under FFW which, in turn, should equal the marginal utility of leisure.
This optimality condition implies that the household’s supply of FFW labor is a function of
the wage rate, the price of food, the marginal product of FFW, and the household’s leisure
preferences.  As certain of these variables cannot be observed directly, inferences must be made
by observing proxy variables.  Moreover, since this model is for a single household, whereas
cross-sectional data for testing the model will include households with differing levels of
resources -- in knowledge, information, land and capital -- specification of an empirical model
should also include such conditioning variables as wealth, education, and age.
Empirical model
The empirical analysis is conducted in the three stages identified in Figure 1.  First, a
probit regression examines what factors determined the availability of FFW projects at the village
level.  Second, for those villages where FFW was available, another probit regression examine
factors affecting household eligibility for FFW.  Third, for those households judged eligible for
FFW, a “double hurdle” regression separately examines a) factors affecting the household’s
Taking first order conditions, the resulting optimality condition is
l
U
  =  
l
f







choice to participate in FFW programs (probit regression), and b) factors affecting the decision by
households that chose to participate on ow many days to devote to FFW work (Cragg, 1971;
Haines et al., 1988; Greene, 1995).
The village-level FFW availability analysis included variables expected to affect both the
need of the village for natural resource conservation, the village poverty level, and the feasibility
of conducting them.  Conservation need was measured by variables for average slope (a measure
of erodibility) and proportion of households mentioning a fuel shortage (a measure of
deforestation).  Relative village poverty was loosely measured by average landholding and total
households in village.  Finally, logistical feasibility was measured by distance to nearest market
town and distance to nearest paved road.  It was expected that need for resource conservation
and poverty would contribute to the probability of FFW conservation projects being available,
while distance to market and paved road were expected to reduce project feasibility and hence
availability.
Among villages where FFW was available, the probability that a household would be
designated as eligible for FFW was expected to be a function chiefly of wealth and income per
capita.  The eligibility probit regression was estimated using the best proxies available for per
capita wealth and income.  Among several highly correlated wealth variables, those included were
cultivable land per capita (LDPERCAP, created by dividing land holdings by household size),
whether the household had “enough draft animal power for farming needs” (ENGHDRFT), whether
it had access to credit (CRDTACS), and whether it used improved seed (SEEDIMP).  Indirect
indicators of income are whether a household member did off-farm work during the previous year13
(OFARMWK) or purchased improved seed (SEEDIMP).  All six wealth and income variables were
expected to reduce the probability of eligibility for FFW.  A variables indicating household need
level was whether it leased out land (LDLSEUT, often an indicator of inadequate resources to
cultivate) which was expected to enhance FFW eligibility.   Household size (SZEHSHD) was
included without prior expectation as to direction of influence on eligibility, since it can be viewed
as either an asset (income-earning capacity, hence a form of wealth) or a need (more mouths to
feed, hence a form of poverty).  Finally, literacy of household head (LITHSHED) was employed as a
conditioning variable, with the expectation that better educated household heads would more
successfully qualify for FFW.
The double hurdle analysis of FFW participation begins with a probit regression to
examine factors that affect whether or not eligible households choose to participate.  The binary
dependent variable PARTICIPATE indicates whether or not eligible households participated in a
FFW program. The influence of the explanatory variables included will differ from the eligibility
regression because a new element enters now: the ability of eligible households to provide the
labor necessary for FFW.  Hence, household size is now expected to increase the probability of
participation.  Off-farm work is expected to decrease participation because it competes with FFW
for available work time.  Other wealth and income variables are again expected to reduce the
likelihood of participation due to less need.  As before, leasing out land indicates greater need and
so is expected to enhance participation, as is literacy of household head.
We apply a truncated regression to examine the decision on how much household labor is
supplied to FFW projects from those households that chose to participate.  The truncated14
regression is applied to the household observations where the dependent variable, DAYSWKD, was
non-zero.  Variables included were the same as those in the probit model, since the theoretically
desirable variables in Equation (2) (wage rate, food price, marginal product of FFW, and the
household’s leisure preferences) either did not vary across households in the survey or else were
unobservable.  Initial expectations were that regression coefficient signs would be similar to the
participation probit regression, but magnitudes would differ.
Results and discussion
The results are presented hierarchically.  We begin with the factors affecting the
availability of FFW projects in the study zone.  In villages where FFW was available, we proceed
to examine the factors that affected eligibility of households.  Among those households
determined by the local community groups to be eligible, we then look into factors that affected
the choices on whether and how much to participate.
Availability of FFW projects
Before FFW targeting can be examined, FFW projects must exist.  This research could not
directly observe the feasibility of different location for FFW.  It could, however, examine which of
the 25 villages studies had FFW conservation public works projects available.  The probit
regression (Table 1) had weak explanatory power, but its chi-square statistic was significant at the
five percent level.  Only the feasibility variables were significant (at the 10% threshold), indicating
that distance to both market and paved road both detracted from the likelihood that a village15
would have FFW a conservation project available.  This result supports the hypothesis that
feasibility factors are more important than any poverty targeting factors in determining where
FFW resource conservation projects are located.  Equally important, neither of the two
conservation need criteria (average slope and wood fuel shortage) proved important for siting
FFW projects.
Eligibility for FFW
In the areas where FFW programs were operational, about 80% of households were likely
to have been eligible for participation, as that many failed to be self-sufficient in food from their
own production (Relief Society of Tigray, 1995).  The eligible percentage in the survey sample
was similar, as shown in Table 2.  Although the differences are not statistically significant,
ineligible households held more land and were more likely to participate in off-farm work than
eligible ones (Table 2).  Ineligible households were also less likely to claim that they had enough
draft power.  The data do not allow us to determine whether this was because their larger farms
required more draft power or because they actually owned fewer draft animals.
The probit regression for eligibility to participate in FFW (Table 3) did an excellent job of
correctly predicting eligibility, but a very poor one of predicting ineligibility.  Household size, per
capita cultivated land and availability of adequate draft animal power were significant variables,
with the first two having the expected signs.  Larger households and those with more cultivated
land per capita were less likely to be selected as eligible.  The positive coefficient on availability of
enough draft power might be explained by the fact that those who participate have less cultivated16
land per capita which requires less draft power.  Literacy of households, off-farm work, access to
credit, and use of improved seed all had the expected signs but were insignificant. The negative
coefficient on land lease practice is consistent with the positive coefficient of availability of
enough draft power. Since agricultural land in central Tigray is distributed based partly on
household size, eligible households have less land available per capita, which may cause them to
lease out land less frequently. 
The correlation between days worked at FFW and days worked at off-farm activities was
very low but positive (r= 0.12).  This suggests that participation in FFW does not compete with
off-farm employment.  Income obtained from off-farm employment was also only weakly
associated with days worked in FFW, although the correlation was negative (r= -0.16), suggesting
that those who did less FFW worked earned more from off-farm activity.  The ineligible
households were about equally divided between those who did and did not participate in off-farm
work.  However, only one-third of the eligible households reported off-farm work.
Participation in FFW conservation projects
What motivated eligible households to participate in FFW?  Of those households which
were eligible, more than 90% actually participated in FFW programs (Table 2).  Compared with
the households that participated in FFW, those who were eligible but did not participate tended to
be small households headed by elderly women who had significantly less land per capita, lacked
adequate draft power, and leased out their fields (Table 2).17
Both the probit regression on whether eligible households chose to participate in FFW
(Table 4) and the truncated regression on the extent of participation (Table 5) gave similar
results.  Whereas household size detracted from eligibility, among eligible households, larger ones
are more likely to participate in FFW and larger households that do participate put more person-
days into FFW.  Leasing out land tends to detract significantly from the probability of
participating in FFW.  Both significant variables are highly correlated with two variables omitted
due to multicollinearity: age and sex.  In Table 3, these variables highlighted the sharply different
characteristics of those households headed by elderly women who could not participate in FFW.
Summary and Conclusions
The multiple objectives inherent in food-for-work projects cannot all be optimized at once.
 Results from this study of FFW resource conservation projects in central Tigray during 1992-95
suggest that logistical feasibility chiefly determines where FFW conservation projects were
located.  Perhaps because the problems of deforestation and soil erosion are so widespread, these
natural resource need criteria did not play an important role in project siting.  However, where
FFW projects were available, the village committees were fairly effective at targeting the poorer
households as eligible.
Among eligible households, the decision to participate in FFW appears to be determined
by ability rather than desire to participate.  The households that did not participate were chiefly
those of elderly women who were unable to do the work.  This implies two things.  First, the daily
food ration was apparently higher than the reservation wage of most households when these FFW18
programs were operating.  Second, the eligible households that did not participate were
constrained by inability to do the work. This result suggests that such households require special
treatment with regard to food assistance.  As it happened, 20 percent of food aid distributed by
the Relief Society of Tigray was donated free to those who could not participate in development
activities  -- specifically households like these.
Food-for-work programs in central Tigray were apparently effective at reaching the
poorer strata of the population, within the limitations of logistical feasibility.  Our results highlight
the trade-offs necessary to reconcile such multiple program objectives as addressing the areas of
greatest resource deterioration, reaching the poorest households, and feasibly meeting the
logistical challenge to delivering labor and supplies where needed.  At the same time, this study
points to the importance of special safety net programs for those who are food insecure but too
infirm to participate in labor-demanding FFW activities.
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Table 1: Results of probit regression on factors affecting availability of Food-for-Work





Distance to market (km) -0.959 -1.88 *
Distance to paved road (km) -0.599 -1.77 *
Average slope (degrees) 0.113 0.72
Average size of land holding (ha) 0.211 0.43
No. of households in village 0.003 1.04
Wood fuel shortage (0/1) -1.617 -1.07
N = 25; c
2 (6) = 12.7; Prob > c
2=0.05;  Log likelihood function =-53.09
* Denotes coefficient significantly different from zero at 10% probability.24


















2.18     
(1.23)
Mean household size SZEHSHD 4.69   
(1.97)
1.67   
(1.12)
5          
(1.90)




46.46   
(12.31)
Percent female-headed households FEMALE 12 77.8 11.5
Percent literate household heads LITHSHED 26.6 0 23.1
Percent participation in off-farm work OFF-FARM 35.2 0 53.8
Percent access to ag. credit CRDTACS 31.2 33.3 30.8
Percent leasing out land LDLSEUT 19.5 88.9 26.9
Percent with enough draft power ENGHDRFT 44 11.1 30.8
Percent with adequate local seed LCLSEED 59.4 50 57.7
* Standard deviations are in parentheses for the continuous variables.25
Table 3:   Results of probit regression on eligibility for participation in FFW programs,





Constant 2.636 4.52 ***
Household size (persons) -0.153 -1.97 **
Literacy of household head (0/1) 0.265 0.77
Off-farm work (0/1) -0.310 -1.04
Access to credit (0/1) -0.070 0.22
Land leased out (0/1) -0.403 -1.09
Adequate draft power available (0/1) 0.856 2.32 **
Improved seed used (0/1) 0.116 0.34
Land per capita (ha/person) -3.214 -3.52 ***
c
2 (8) = 20.7; Log likelihood function =-53.09. 
Correctly predicted eligibility: 98%; non-eligibility: 12%.
*  Denotes coefficient significantly different from zero at 10% probability.
**  Denotes coefficient significantly different from zero at 5% probability.
*** Denotes coefficient significantly different from zero at 1% probability.26
Table 4:  Results of probit regression on participation in FFW programs by 105 FFW-






Household size (persons) 1.043 1.75 *
Off-farm work  (0/1) 5.931 0.10
Land leased out (0/1) -3.527 -2.30 **
Improved seed used (0/1) 4.944 0.08
Land per capita (ha/person) 0.187 0.06
N.B.  Due to collinearity problems, the literacy, credit access and draft power variables were
omitted from the regression.
c
2 (5) = 41.5; Log likelihood function =-5.04
Correctly predicted participation: 99%; non-participation: 71%.
*  Denotes coefficient significantly different from zero at 10% probability.
**  Denotes coefficient significantly different from zero at 5% probability.27







Household size (persons) 88.71 1.79 *
Literacy of household head (0/1) 251.42 1.54
Off-farm work  (0/1) 39.45 0.35
Access to credit (0/1) 124.25 0.95
Land leased out (0/1) -337.46 -1.23
Adequate draft power available (0/1) -97.08 -0.75
Improved seed used (0/1) 2.67 0.02
Land per capita (ha/person) -314.66 -0.86
s 221.75 69.34
Log likelihood function = -517.61
*  Denotes coefficient significantly different from zero at 10% probability.28
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Household Does household choose to
participate in FFW?
If so, how much?